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PROTECTING CHILDREN? THE 
EVOLUTION OF THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT: 
A HISTORICAL TIMELINE OF 
CHILDREN AND THEIR ACCESS TO 
PORNOGRAPHY AND VIOLENCE 
 
Nicole DiGiose* 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The United States Constitution states: “Congress shall 
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press . . . .”1 The Constitution ensures that the government will 
not infringe upon certain rights, and perhaps one of the most 
important rights that a person retains is their right to freedom 
of speech. While the Constitution ensures that free speech will 
not be violated, there are some exceptions that are not covered 
by the First Amendment: obscenity,2 fighting words,3 
incitement,4 and defamation,5 to name a few. However, when 
children are involved, freedom of speech issues become unclear. 
While adults are able to enjoy certain means of speech, 
historically the Supreme Court has decided that children and 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2013, Pace University School of Law. I would 
like to thank my family and friends for their continued love and 
support, especially my mother, Dale—without all of you, I 
wouldn’t have made it to where I am today. I would also like to 
thank Professor Bennett Gershman for sparking my interest in 
constitutional law and his guidance and assistance with this 
paper—without your help, I’m afraid this paper would still be 
scribbles in a notebook! 
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
2. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). 
3. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942). 
4. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
5. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988). 
1
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their innocence may not be protected, and their rights may be 
closer to those that adults enjoy.6 
This paper will explore the evolving relationship between 
children and their access to potentially harmful materials. The 
timeline will start at Part II.A with the landmark decision of 
Prince v. Massachusetts,7 a 1940’s case, wherein children were 
afforded the most constitutional protection.8 In Part II.B, this 
paper will evaluate another landmark decision: Ginsberg v. 
New York.9 In this 1968 case, the Supreme Court declared that 
children shall not have access to harmful, pornographic 
materials.10 By the 1990s, there appeared to be a notable shift 
in how the Supreme Court decided cases pertaining to children 
and their access to potentially harmful materials.11 Part III of 
this paper will assess less stringent protections of children. 
Particularly, Part III.A will review Denver Area Educational 
Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC,12 a 1996 case 
concerning children and their access to materials on cable 
television.13 Additionally, in Part III.B, this paper will explore 
children’s access to materials on the Internet in Reno v. 
ACLU.14 In Part III.C, this paper will take an interesting look 
at Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,15 a 2002 case exploring a 
new technological development, virtual child pornography. In 
Part IV.A, the timeline will come to an end with the recently 
decided Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n,16 wherein 
the Supreme Court opted to allow children to have access to 
violent video games, a 180 degree shift from the Ginsberg 
decision regarding pornography, decided only forty-five years 
earlier. 
 
 
 
6. See generally Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011). 
7. 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
8. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
9. 390 U.S. 629 (1968). 
10. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
11. See discussion infra Parts III.A, III.B. 
12. 518 U.S. 727 (1996). 
13. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
14. 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
15. 535 U.S. 234 (2002). 
16. 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss1/10
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Finally, in Part IV.B, this paper will evaluate this timeline 
of landmark Supreme Court decisions to determine if the 
Supreme Court went too far with the Brown decision. In 2011, 
the Court decided that children should have access to violent 
video games, which may have potentially harmful effects, 
rather than ensuring their innocence.17 In making this decision 
the Court ignored new technological advances and potential 
adverse effects these games may have on children’s 
psychological and behavioral development. This paper will 
address these issues and speculate as to what may happen in 
the future. 
 
II. Children Afforded the Most Constitutional Protection 
 
A. Prince v. Massachusetts (1944) 
 
The Prince case displays an important foundation laid by 
the Court: protecting children is of the utmost importance.18 
Although the case does not directly involve a child’s access to 
harmful materials, it involves a child’s exposure to a dangerous 
practice: child labor.19 Sarah Prince was attempting to exercise 
her religious convictions by distributing Jehovah’s Witness 
magazines.20 She was out with her nine-year-old niece, Betty, 
who was attempting to help Prince with her sales.21 When 
approached by a police officer trying to enforce a statute 
prohibiting child labor, Prince refused to disclose Betty’s age 
and identity.22 The statute prohibiting child labor read, “[n]o 
boy under twelve and no girl under eighteen shall sell, expose 
or offer for sale any newspapers, magazines, periodicals or any 
other articles of merchandise . . . in any street or public 
place.”23 The statute went on to say, “[a]ny parent, guardian or 
custodian having a minor under his control who compels or 
 
17. Id. at 2741. 
18. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944). 
19. See generally id. 
20. Id. at 161. 
21. Id. at 159-60. 
22. Id. at 162. 
23. Id. at 160-61 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 69 (West 
2012)). 
3
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permits such minor to work in violation of any provision . . . 
shall for a first offence be punished . . . .”24 Prince claimed that 
Betty was “exercising her God-given right and her 
constitutional right to preach the gospel . . . .”25 Prince was 
convicted of violating Massachusetts’s child labor laws, and 
subsequently appealed.26 
In his decision, Justice Rutledge acknowledged that 
parents have a right to give their children “religious training 
and to encourage them in the practice of religious belief . . . .”27 
However, he went on to say, neither rights of religion nor 
rights of parenthood are beyond limitation. Acting to guard the 
general interest in youth’s well being, the state as parens 
patriae may restrict the parent’s control by requiring school 
attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child’s labor, and in 
many other ways.28 He continued to say “that the state has a 
wide range of power for limiting parental freedom and 
authority in things affecting the child’s welfare; and that this 
includes, to some extent, matters of conscience and religious 
conviction.”29 Finally, he stated, “the state’s authority over 
children’s activities is broader than over like actions of 
adults.”30 
This decision set the stage for the later Supreme Court 
decisions aimed at protecting children.31 Although this case 
pertained to child labor, it nonetheless showed that the 
government has the authority to limit certain rights in an 
effort to protect the welfare of children.32 Furthermore, Prince 
held that the state has a “wide range of power” to limit what 
parents can and cannot do regarding their own children, 
especially in regard to matters of “conscience and religious 
conviction.”33 The words “wide range of power” in areas of 
“conscience” and “religious conviction” imply that the Court is 
 
24. Id. at 161 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 81 (West 2012)). 
25. Id. at 162. 
26. Id. at 159. 
27. Id. at 165. 
28. Id. at 166 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
29. Id. at 167 (emphasis added). 
30. Id. at 168 (emphasis added). 
31. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). 
32. Prince, 321 U.S. at 168. 
33. Id. at 167. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss1/10
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willing to protect children even if it means restricting parents’ 
rights. The words “wide range of power,” especially, indicate 
that it is within the Court’s authority to get involved in some 
aspects of private life that will protect children, perhaps even 
matters of pornography and violence, since such matters are 
definitely encompassed in the phrase “conscience or religious 
conviction.” The Court is ultimately saying that they can, and 
will, do whatever possible to protect the well-being of children. 
Although the Court attempts to limit their decision by stating, 
“[o]ur ruling does not extend beyond the facts the case 
presents,”34 numerous future courts have cited to this decision, 
reiterating the overall tone of the decision,35 which implies one 
of the Court’s priorities: protecting children even if it means 
interfering with parenting decisions.36 
 
B. Ginsberg v. New York (1968) 
 
The Ginsberg case is perhaps one of the most important 
cases to date pertaining to protecting children and their access 
to harmful materials.37 It has been cited in over 750 cases and 
as recently as December 4, 2012. In Ginsberg, the appellant 
operated a stationary and luncheonette on Long Island, where 
he sold lunch and magazines, including “girlie” magazines.38 
Here, the so-called “girlie” magazines were those that 
contained pictures which depicted female nudity, particularly 
female buttocks or female breasts, with less than a full opaque 
covering.39 The appellant was convicted of personally selling 
two “girlie” magazines to a sixteen-year-old boy, on two 
separate occasions in October 1965, in violation of Section 484-
h of the New York Penal Law.40 The lower court found that the 
 
34. Id. at 171. 
35. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990); Bellotti v. 
Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Ginsberg 
v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 
531 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
36. Prince, 321 U.S. at 171. 
37. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 629. 
38. Id. at 631. 
39. Id. at 632. 
40. Id. at 631. The law in question in Ginsberg reads, in pertinent part: 
 
5
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magazines contained pictures that depicted female “nudity” 
and that the pictures were “harmful to minors,” but the 
appellant appealed the conviction until it reached the Supreme 
Court.41 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine 
whether the New York law violated the appellant’s First 
Amendment rights and affirmed the decision, holding that the 
state had an “exigent interest in preventing the distribution to 
children of objectionable material,”42 the statute did not invade 
“the area of freedom of expression constitutionally guaranteed 
to minors,”43 and the argument that the statute was void for 
vagueness was wholly without merit.44 
 
 
1. Definitions. As used in this section: 
(a) ‘Minor’ means any person under the age of seventeen 
years . . . 
(f) ‘Harmful to minors’ means that quality of any description 
or representation, in whatever form, of nudity, sexual 
conduct, sexual excitement, or sadomasochistic abuse, when 
it: 
(i) predominantly appeals to the prurient, shameful or 
morbid interest of minors, and 
(ii) is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult 
community as a whole with respect to what is suitable 
material for minors, and 
(iii) is utterly without redeeming social importance for 
minors . . . . 
2. It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to sell or 
loan for monetary consideration to a minor: 
(a) any picture, photograph, drawing, sculpture, motion 
picture film, or similar visual representation or image of a 
person or portion of the human body which depicts nudity, 
sexual conduct, or sadomasochistic abuse and which is 
harmful to minors, or 
(b) any book, pamphlet, magazine, printed matter however 
reproduced, or sound recording which contains any matter 
enumerated in paragraph (a) . . . or explicit and detailed 
verbal descriptions or narrative accounts of sexual 
excitement, sexual conduct, or sado-masochistic abuse, and 
which, taken as a whole is harmful to minors. 
 
Id. at 645-47 (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 484-h (McKinney 1965) (current 
version at N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.21 (McKinney 2012)). 
41. See id. at 631-33. 
42. Id. at 636. 
43. Id. at 637. 
44. Id. at 645. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss1/10
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The Court first noted that the “girlie” magazines involved 
in this matter fit into the definition of obscenity, which “is not 
within the area of protected speech or press.”45 Since 
obscenities do not fall within First Amendment protections, the 
Court is required to apply the more stringent strict scrutiny 
standard.46 However, here the Court applied a lessor scrutiny 
due to the fact that the case dealt with a prohibition on the sale 
to minors of sexual material that would be considered obscene 
for a child.47 The Court determined that the statute could be 
sustained so long as the legislature’s judgment that the 
proscribed materials were harmful to children “was not 
irrational.”48 The Court reasoned that the well-being of 
children was within the State’s constitutional power to regulate 
since “it was rational for the legislature to find that the minors’ 
exposure to such material might be harmful.”49 Furthermore, 
“[t]he State . . . has an independent interest in the well-being of 
its youth.”50 The interest in protecting the well-being of our 
nation’s youth was first recognized in Prince v. Massachusetts, 
wherein the State “ha[d] an interest to protect the welfare of 
children and to see that they are safeguarded from abuses 
which might prevent their growth into free and independent 
well-developed men and citizens.”51 
In Ginsberg, the State showed that the law was 
substantially related to the interest of protecting children with 
legislative findings showing that the condemned material was 
“a basic factor in impairing the ethical and moral development 
of . . . youth . . . .”52 There was “no lack of studies [that] 
purported to demonstrate” this idea.53 Although these studies 
did not demonstrate a causal link, they did not disprove a 
 
45. Id. at 635 (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957)). 
46. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2735 (2011). 
47. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 641-42. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 639. 
50. Id. at 640. 
51. Id. at 640-41 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 
(1944)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
52. Id. at 641 (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 484-h (McKinney 1965) 
(current version at N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.21 (McKinney 2012)). 
53. Id. 
7
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causal link either; this was sufficient for the Court.54 The Court 
went on to emphasize that there is a difference between minors 
and adults: adults may have constitutional rights to some 
materials, but minors do not.55 Here, there was an “exigent 
interest in preventing distribution to children of objectionable 
material.”56 Once again, the Court stressed that protecting 
children, particularly their well-being, development, and 
morals, is more important than protecting their constitutional 
right to access certain questionable and potentially harmful 
materials. The Court again reiterated the holding of Prince: 
“‘the power of the state to control the conduct of children 
reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults.’”57 One of 
the Court’s priorities was still to safeguard children from any 
harm that could potentially damage their moral and/or ethical 
development, even if adults could lawfully access the materials 
in question. 
 
III. Less Stringent Protection of Children 
 
A. Denver Area Educational Telecommunications 
Consortium, Inc. v. FCC (1996) 
 
After the Court decided cases pertaining to child labor and 
sexually explicit print materials, the 1990s saw cases decided 
involving different mediums. In Denver Area Educational 
Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC,58 the Supreme 
Court decided whether the Cable Television Consumer 
Protection and Competition Act of 1992, implemented by the 
Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”), was 
constitutional.59 The Act was originally challenged by various 
 
54. Id. at 642. 
55. Id. at 636. 
56. Id. (emphasis added). 
57. Id. at 638 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 
(1944)). 
58. 518 U.S. 727 (1996). 
59. Id. 
 
[I]n an effort to control sexually explicit programming 
conveyed over access channels, Congress enacted . . . three 
provisions . . . . The first . . . “permit[ted] a cable operator to 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss1/10
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cable providers, who were victorious when a panel of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit found all three provisions of the Act unconstitutional.60 
However, the Court of Appeals sitting en banc came to the 
opposite conclusion, finding that the Act was constitutional.61 
Justice Breyer opened his decision by stating, “[t]he 
history of this Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence . . . is 
one of continual development . . . [and] has been applied to new 
circumstances requiring different adaptations of prior 
principles and precedents.”62 This statement indicates that the 
1990s have brought different mediums to light and may need to 
be addressed differently. He further stated that the tradition 
embodies the Court’s dedication to protect speech from 
regulation, “but without imposing . . . formulas so rigid that 
they become a straitjacket that disables government from 
responding to serious problems.”63 This is a noticeable 
departure from the language of the previous two Supreme 
Court decisions cited in this paper. While the Court must 
protect constitutionally guaranteed rights, they may not do so 
in an extreme nature. Finally, before addressing the specific 
issue in Denver, Justice Breyer reiterated the Court’s power to 
address extraordinary problems with “appropriately tailored” 
 
. . . prohibit[] programming that the cable operator 
reasonably believe[d] describe[d] or depict[ed] sexual or 
excretory activities or organs in a patently offensive manner 
as measured by contemporary community standards.” The 
second . . . require[d] cable operators to segregate and . . . 
block similar programming if they decide[d] to permit . . . its 
broadcast. . . . The third provision . . . “enable[d] . . . cable 
operator[s] . . . to prohibit the use . . . of any channel 
capacity of any public, educational, or governmental access 
facility for any programming which contains obscene 
material, sexually explicit conduct, or material soliciting or 
promoting unlawful conduct.” 
 
Id. at 734-36 (quoting Cable Television Consumer Protection and 
Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992)). 
60. Id. at 736 (citing Alliance for Cmty. Media v. FCC, 10 F.3d 812 
(1993)). 
61. Id. (citing Alliance for Cmty. Media v. FCC, 56 F.3d 105 (1995)). 
62. Id. at 740. 
63. Id. at 741. 
9
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regulations.64 Citing Ginsberg, the Court stated that this case 
dealt with an extremely important justification that the “Court 
has often found compelling- the need to protect children from 
exposure to patently offensive sex-related material.”65 
The Court found that the first provision was 
constitutionally permissible for various reasons: the need to 
protect children, the fact that children have a wide range of 
access to television broadcasting, and the permissive nature of 
the restriction.66 Overall, the first restriction allowed operators 
to reschedule programming, rather than implementing a 
complete ban, while balancing the interests of protecting 
children and protecting speech.67 The second and third 
provisions, however, did not pass constitutional muster.68 The 
second provision required a complete restriction on patently 
offensive materials on leased channels.69 While the Court again 
stated that protecting children is a “compelling interest,” they 
found that the “segregate and block” requirement was not the 
proper way to manage this interest.70 In reaching this 
conclusion, the Court used a hybrid test resembling strict 
scrutiny: whether the regulation was the “least restrictive 
alternative” and whether it was “narrowly tailored” to meet its 
objective.71 The Court held that the second provision was 
“overly restrictive, ‘sacrific[ing]’ important First Amendment 
interests for too ‘speculative a gain.’”72 Finally, the Court 
looked at the third provision, one that was very similar to the 
permissible first provision, but dealt with public access 
channels. Historically, operators have not exercised editorial 
control over these channels.73 Additionally, the Court pointed 
out that there are supervising boards for these channels to 
monitor what goes on the air, and there was no need to have 
 
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 743 (emphasis added) (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 
629, 639-40 (1968)). 
66. See id. at 743-46. 
67. See id. at 747. 
  68. See id. at 753-66. 
69. Id. at 753. 
70. Id. at 755. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. at 760 (citations omitted). 
73. Id. at 761 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 98-934, at 30 (1984)). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss1/10
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this provision.74 The government simply did not meet its 
burden, which resembled strict scrutiny, to prove that the 
provision “[was] necessary to protect children or that it [was] 
appropriately tailored” to do so.75 
This case represents somewhat of a middle ground in the 
Court’s mindset toward protecting children’s innocence and 
well-being via their access to potentially harmful materials, 
versus protecting First Amendment rights. While the Court 
explicitly pointed out, at least three separate times in the 
decision,76 that children and their protection from harmful 
materials represents a compelling governmental interest, it 
still concluded that the regulations in Denver did not 
appropriately balance the competing interests.77 Since the case 
involved obscene materials, the hybrid test, which resembles 
strict scrutiny, was appropriate.78 However, the regulations did 
not meet the hybrid test.79 The laws simply did not regulate the 
area narrowly enough, meaning that the children’s First 
Amendment rights prevailed.80 
 
B. Reno v. ACLU (1997) 
 
The Internet has revolutionized the way our society works 
by transforming the way we transmit data and information. 
Instead of physically going to a store to purchase something, 
consumers can do so in the comfort of their homes with the 
simple click of their mouse. However, with such a wide-open 
information network, it is almost inevitable that harmful 
materials may end up on the Internet and in the hands of naive 
children who should be shielded from access to these materials. 
The first major Supreme Court ruling regarding materials 
distributed over the Internet came in 1997, in Reno v. ACLU.81 
 
 
74. Id. at 762. 
75. Id. at 766 (citations omitted). 
76. See id. at 743, 747, 755. 
77. Id. at 756. 
78. Id. at 755. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 756. 
81. 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
11
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The court started by noting that 
 
[t]he Internet has experienced “extraordinary 
growth.” The number of “host” computers—those 
that store information and relay 
communications—increased from about [three 
hundred] in 1981 to approximately 9,400,000 by 
the time of the trial in 1996. . . . About [forty] 
million people used the Internet at the time of 
trial, a number that [was] expected to mushroom 
to [two hundred] million by 1999.”82 
 
Users can take advantage of a wide variety of 
communication techniques, the most relevant to the case being 
e-mail, mail exploders, listservs, newsgroups, chat rooms, etc.83 
“From the publishers’ point of view, [the Internet] constitutes a 
vast platform from which to address and hear from a 
worldwide audience of millions . . . .”84 The Internet also 
provides a means to transmit obscene or sexually explicit 
material.85 In order to protect children, various systems were 
developed to help control the material available on a home 
computer by blocking inappropriate sites, for example.86 
Eventually, commercial pornographic cites popped up that 
charged users for access as a means of age verification.87 In 
1996, the Telecommunications Act was passed, which included 
The Communications Decency Act of 1996 (“CDA”), which 
further included “the ‘indecent transmission’ provision and the 
‘patently offensive display’ provision.”88 The CDA stated that it 
was a crime to make, create, solicit, or initiate the transmission 
of indecent or sexually explicit material to anyone under the 
age of eighteen.89 
 
82. Id. at 850 (footnote omitted). 
83. Id. at 851. 
84. Id. at 853. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. at 854-55. 
87. Id. at 856. 
88. Id. at 859 (footnote omitted); see Telecommunications Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56. 
89. Reno, 521 U.S. at 859-61 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 223(a) (2006)). 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss1/10
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The lower court entered a preliminary injunction against 
the enforcement of the two challenged provisions, holding that 
the statutes violated the First Amendment, because they were 
overbroad, and the Fifth Amendment, because they were 
vague.90 The government appealed, attempting to rely, in part, 
on the Court’s decision in Ginsberg.91 
However, the government was unsuccessful in its appeal 
and the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision, 
enjoining the Act.92 Specifically, the Court pointed out 
differences between the statute in Ginsberg and the CDA, 
finding that the statute in Ginsberg was much narrower in four 
important respects.93 “First, . . . in Ginsberg[,] ‘the prohibition 
against sales to minors [did] not bar parents . . . from [buying] 
the magazines for their children.’”94 On the other hand, under 
the CDA, neither the parents’ consent nor their participation 
could get around the statute.95 “Second, the New York statute 
applied only to commercial transactions, whereas the CDA 
contains no such limitation.”96 Third, the statutes differed on 
their definitions pertaining to the material they forbade. The 
New York statute stated that in order to be harmful to minors, 
the material must be “utterly without redeeming social 
importance for minors.”97 Meanwhile, the CDA “fail[ed] to 
provide any definition of [the term] indecent.”98 Finally, New 
York defined a minor as anyone under the age of seventeen, 
while the CDA defined a minor as anyone under the age of 
eighteen.99 
These four differences help emphasize the notion that the 
Court had become more meticulous about requirements to 
block certain material. One regulation was able to pass 
constitutional muster, while the other was found 
unconstitutional. This can be attributed to the language of the 
 
90. Id. at 862-63. 
91. Id. at 864. 
92. Id. at 885. 
93. Id. at 865. 
94. Id. (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968)). 
95. Id. 
96. Id. (citation omitted). 
97. Id. (quoting Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 646). 
98. Id. 
99. Id. at 865-66. 
13
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regulations: the language of the regulation in Ginsberg was 
both more meticulous and more specific. This suggests that the 
Court requires a more specific and narrowly tailored 
restriction, which the CDA did not possess. The Court 
concluded that the CDA did not have the “precision that the 
First Amendment requires” for content-based restrictions.100 
The CDA suppressed a large amount of speech, which adults 
have a constitutional right to enjoy, in order to deny minors 
access to potentially harmful speech.101 This burden on speech 
is impermissible if the legitimate purpose can be achieved by 
less restrictive means.102 The Court appears to be prioritizing 
rights over the protection and innocence of children, especially 
when the material is suitable for adults. The Court goes on to 
state that just because something is offensive does not mean 
that it may be suppressed.103 The Court is now erring on the 
side of preserving the free flow of ideas rather than censuring 
and limiting access to them. Finally, the Court recognizes that 
there is a strong governmental interest in protecting children 
from harmful materials.104 However, this “interest does not 
justify an unnecessarily broad suppression of speech addressed 
to adults.”105 “[T]he government may not ‘reduc[e] the adult 
population . . . to . . . only what is fit for children.’”106 
“‘[R]egardless of the strength of the government’s interest in 
protecting children, ‘[t]he level of discourse reaching a mailbox 
simply cannot be limited to that which would be suitable for a 
sandbox.’”107 The Court’s language makes it evident that one of 
its new priorities is to protect the rights of free speech and 
expression rather than ensuring children develop morally and 
ethically, as the Court once stated in Ginsberg. 
 
 
100. Id. at 874. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. at 875 (citing FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978)). 
104. Id. (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968); Pacifica 
Found., 438 U.S. at 749). 
105. Id. 
106. Id. (quoting Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. 
FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 759 (1996)). 
107. Id. (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74 
(1983)). 
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C. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition (2002) 
 
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition discussed the situation 
surrounding the Child Pornography Prevention Act 
(“CPPA”).108 In 1996, the CPPA was passed.109 The Act 
“extend[ed] the federal prohibition against child pornography 
to sexually explicit images that appear to depict minors but 
were produced without using any real children.”110 The Act 
focused on virtual child pornography, which uses adults who 
look like minors or computer images to simulate child 
pornography.111 This new technology made it possible to create 
realistic images of people and children who did not exist.112 At 
the time the Free Speech Coalition challenged the statute, 
there was a circuit split over whether the CPPA was 
constitutional.113 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
decide whether the CPPA infringed upon First Amendment 
Rights.114 The Court held that the CPPA was overbroad and 
therefore, unconstitutional.115 Because teenage sexuality has 
been a theme of art, movies, and literature in modern society, 
the Court concluded that these images could not be considered 
obscene, as any possessor of these items would be subject to 
punishment.116 The Court also held that “[v]irtual child 
pornography is not ‘intrinsically related’ to the sexual abuse of 
children . . . .”117 Finally, the Court found that “[t]he mere 
tendency of speech to encourage unlawful acts is not a 
sufficient reason for banning it” and the argument that virtual 
child pornography may encourage pedophiles to act unlawfully 
 
108. 535 U.S. 234 (2002). 
109. Id. at 239. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. at 239-40. 
112. Id. at 240. 
113. See id. at 244. 
114. Id.; see United States v. Fox, 248 F.3d 394 (5th Cir. 2001); United 
States v. Mento, 231 F.3d 912 (4th Cir. 2001); United States v. Acheson, 195 
F.3d 645 (11th Cir. 1999); United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 
1999). 
115. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 258. 
116. Id. at 247-49. 
117. Id. at 250. 
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is unsustainable,118 absent a showing that the speech will incite 
imminent lawless action.119 
The Court reiterated what it has said in previous 
decisions: “that speech within the rights of adults to hear may 
not be silenced completely in an attempt to shield children from 
it.”120 The Court went on to say that “[t]he government may not 
prohibit speech because it increases the chance an unlawful act 
will be committed ‘at some indefinite future time.’”121 “The 
government may suppress speech for advocating the use of 
force or a violation of law only if ‘such advocacy is directed to 
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to 
incite or produce such action.’”122 The Court did not find the 
incitement outlined in Brandenburg in this case; rather, there 
was only a remote connection between the virtual pornography 
and the chance that pedophiles may act on it.123 
The Court’s holding in Ashcroft, like its holding in Reno, 
found that the CPPA did not meet the precise restriction 
required by the First Amendment. Rather than upholding a 
law blocking questionable materials, the Court preferred to 
tread lightly and preserve the rights of its citizens. The Court 
may be ignoring something very important—the fact that this 
speech could really harm children and that perhaps more 
narrowly drawn laws, rather than sweeping prohibitions, could 
possibly pass constitutional muster. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
118. Id. at 253. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. at 252 (citing Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 
(1989)). 
121. Id. at 253 (quoting Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973) (per 
curiam)). 
122. Id. (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per 
curiam)). 
123. See id. at 253-54. 
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IV. Going Too Far? Children’s First Amendment Rights 
Favored over Their Protection 
 
A. Brown v. Entertainment Merchant’s Ass’n (2011) 
 
This small selection of cases, dating from the 1940s to the 
new millennium, shows a change in the Supreme Court’s 
attitude, especially with the invention of new interfaces to 
access information. Originally, one of the Court’s priorities was 
to protect children and their purity.124 As the years passed, new 
technology was discovered and used by the masses, society’s 
values changed, and access to information became easier. This 
influenced one of the Court’s new priorities: to ensure that 
First Amendment rights are protected. Brown v. Entertainment 
Merchant’s Ass’n, a recent Supreme Court decision, dealt with 
the censuring of violent video games from minors in the state of 
California.125 A California Act was passed that “prohibit[ed] the 
sale or rental of ‘violent video games’ to minors, and require[d] 
their packaging to be labeled ‘18.’”126 The Act applied to minors 
under the age of eighteen,127 and defined video games as “any 
electronic amusement device that utilizes a computer, 
microprocessor, or similar electronic circuitry and its own 
monitor, or is designed to be used with a television set or a 
computer monitor, that interacts with the user of the device.”128 
The Act prohibited violent video games in which: 
 
the range of options available to a player 
includes killing, maiming, dismembering, or 
sexually assaulting an image of a human being, 
if those acts are depicted in the game in a 
manner that does either of the following: 
(A) Comes within all of the following 
descriptions: 
(i) A reasonable person, considering the 
 
124. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). 
125. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011). 
126. Id. at 2732 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1746-1746.5 (West 2009)). 
127. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1746(a) (West 2009). 
128. Id. § 1746(c). 
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game as a whole, would find appeals to a 
deviant or morbid interest of minors 
(ii) It is patently offensive to prevailing 
standards in the community as to what is 
suitable for minors 
(iii) It causes the game, as a whole, to lack 
serious literary, artistic, political, or 
scientific value for minors. 
(B) Enables the player to virtually inflict 
serious injury upon images of human beings 
or characters with substantially human 
characteristics in a manner which is 
especially heinous, cruel, or depraved in that 
it involves torture or serious physical abuse 
to the victim.129 
 
The definitions of heinous, cruel, depraved, and torture 
include things that are “shockingly atrocious” or involve “a high 
degree of pain,” “physical abuse,” “substantial risk of death,” 
“mental abuse,” etc.130 To determine if the violence depicted in 
 
129. Id. § 1746(d)(1). 
130. Id. § 1746(d)(2). The definitions read, in full: 
 
(A) “Cruel” means that the player intends to virtually inflict 
a high degree of pain by torture or serious physical abuse of 
the victim in addition to killing the victim. 
(B) “Depraved” means that the player relishes the virtual 
killing or shows indifference to the suffering of the victim, 
as evidenced by torture or serious physical abuse of the 
victim. 
(C) “Heinous” means shockingly atrocious. For the killing 
depicted in a video game to be heinous, it must involve 
additional acts of torture or serious physical abuse of the 
victim as set apart from other killings. 
(D) “Serious physical abuse” means a significant or 
considerable amount of injury or damage to the victim's 
body which involves a substantial risk of death, 
unconsciousness, extreme physical pain, substantial 
disfigurement, or substantial impairment of the function of 
a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty. Serious physical 
abuse, unlike torture, does not require that the victim be 
conscious of the abuse at the time it is inflicted. However, 
the player must specifically intend the abuse apart from the 
killing. 
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the game was especially cruel, depraved, or heinous, factors to 
be considered were the “infliction of gratuitous violence upon 
the victim beyond that necessary to commit the killing, 
needless mutilation of the victim’s body, and the helplessness 
of the victim.”131 
A pre-enforcement challenge was brought by video game 
and software industries in the United States District Court for 
the Northern District of California.132 The District Court 
“concluded that the Act violated the First Amendment and 
permanently enjoined its enforcement.”133 On appeal, the 
decision was affirmed.134 The Supreme Court granted certiorari 
to determine whether the ban of “violent video games” for 
minors violated their First Amendment rights.135 The Court 
affirmed the lower court’s decision, and held that video games 
qualify for First Amendment protection,136 new categories of 
unprotected speech may not be added,137 that “[b]ecause the 
Act imposes a restriction on the content of protected speech, it 
is invalid unless California can demonstrate that it passes 
strict scrutiny—that is, unless it is justified by a compelling 
government interest and is narrowly drawn to serve that 
interest,”138 and that because California was unable to meet 
that burden, the statute was unconstitutional.139 
 
 
(E) “Torture” includes mental as well as physical abuse of 
the victim. In either case, the virtual victim must be 
conscious of the abuse at the time it is inflicted; and the 
player must specifically intend to virtually inflict severe 
mental or physical pain or suffering upon the victim, apart 
from killing the victim. 
 
Id. 
131. § 1746(d)(3). 
132. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011). 
133. Id. (citing Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, No. C-
05-04188 (RMW), 2007 WL 2261546 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2007)). 
134. Id. (citing Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 
F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 2009)). 
135. Id. 
136. Id. at 2733. 
137. Id. at 2734; see also United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 
(2010). 
138. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. at 2738 (citation omitted). 
139. Id. at 2739. 
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B. Analysis of the Brown Decision 
 
In its decision, the Court first “acknowledge[d] that video 
games qualify for First Amendment protection.”140 
Furthermore, the Court determined that United States v. 
Stevens,141 a case holding “that new categories of unprotected 
speech may not be added to the list by a legislature that 
concludes certain speech is too harmful to be tolerated,” was 
controlling in Brown.142 The Court in Stevens held that violent 
speech regulations could not be made to look like obscenity 
regulations.143 This is of particular importance because by 
failing to either create a new category of unprotected speech or 
categorize violence with obscenities, the Court determined that 
the appropriate test was strict scrutiny.144 The strict scrutiny 
standard of review requires “a compelling government interest 
that is narrowly drawn to serve that interest,”145 as opposed to 
the lesser scrutiny applied in Ginsberg, where minors and 
unprotected speech (obscenities) were involved.146 This means 
that violence is a protected form of speech, unlike obscenities, 
which is why it receives the highest level of scrutiny. 
Furthermore, “[t]he State must specifically identify an ‘actual 
problem’ in need of solving,” and infringing on free speech must 
be necessary to solve that problem.147 This standard is very 
demanding, and the Court held that California did not meet 
it.148 The State provided evidence that was not compelling, such 
as “studies purporting to show a connection between exposure 
to . . . video games and harmful effects,” but these studies were 
rejected because they showed a correlation, rather than 
showing that the games cause minors to act aggressively.149 
 
 
140. Id. at 2733. 
141. 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010). 
142. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2734. 
143. Id. (citing Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1591). 
144. See id. at 2738. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. at 2735 (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1969)). 
147. Id. at 2738. 
148. Id. (citing United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 818 
(2000)). 
149. Id. (citations omitted). 
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In the present case, as well as in other attempts to 
regulate violent video games, “[s]tates have commonly 
advanced two [legitimate] rationales . . . : ‘preventing violent, 
aggressive, and antisocial behavior; and preventing 
psychological or neurological harm to minors who play . . . [the] 
games.’”150 Unfortunately, “beyond mere recitation of a 
compelling interest, the government bears the burden to 
‘demonstrate that the recited harms are real, not merely 
conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact alleviate these 
harms in a direct and material way.’”151 Again, unfortunately, 
the courts almost always view the states’ scientific evidence 
with great skepticism.152 It is interesting to note that just forty-
five years prior, the Court in Ginsberg actually embraced 
studies that were less than conclusive in their proof of 
causation.153 This inconsistency provides even more evidence 
that values and priorities have shifted over a relatively short 
period of time. 
In order to further arguments that violent “video games 
[should] fall under exceptions to the First Amendment’s 
protections,” and thereby trigger a lesser degree of scrutiny, 
various states have unsuccessfully attempted to argue “that 
video games constitute [(1)] obscene speech, [(2)] speech that is 
harmful to minors, and [(3)] speech that incites imminent 
lawless action.”154 
As stated above and reaffirmed by the Stevens case, 
violence does not fall under the category of obscenity.155 
Obscenity is defined as “works, which taken as a whole, appeal 
to the prurient interest in sex, which portray sexual conduct in 
a patently offensive way and . . . do not have serious literary, 
 
150. James Dunkelberger, Comment, The New Resident Evil? State 
Regulation of Violent Video Games and the First Amendment, 2011 B.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1659, 1665-66 (2011) (quoting Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. 
Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 2009)). 
151. Id. at 1666 (quoting Video Software Dealers Ass’n, 556 F.3d at 962). 
152. Id. at 1666-67. 
153. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 641-42 (1968). 
154. Gregory Kenyota, Note, Thinking of the Children: The Failure of 
Violent Video Game Laws, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 785, 
799-800 (2008). 
155. See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010). 
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artistic, political, or scientific value.”156 
In attempting to rely on the concept that video games are 
harmful to minors, states have urged the Court to rely on the 
decision in Ginsberg.157 Since the statue in Brown mirrors the 
statute in Ginsberg, the Court in Brown evaluated why one was 
successful and one was not.158 Ginsberg involved obscenities, 
which are not protected by the First Amendment; therefore, 
they could be regulated as long as the finding that they were 
harmful to children was not irrational, thereby passing 
intermediate scrutiny.159 Violent video games, on the other 
hand, do not fall into an unprotected category and the Court in 
Brown was unwilling to create one.160 Because “minors are 
entitled to a significant measure of First Amendment 
protection . . . only in relatively narrow and well-defined 
circumstances may government bar public dissemination of 
protected materials to them.”161 The Court acknowledges that a 
state does possess “power to protect children from harm, but 
[this] does not [extend to] . . . ideas to which children may be 
exposed.”162 Rather than protecting children from these 
potentially harmful ideas, the Court found that suppression of 
these ideas would be more detrimental to others’ First 
Amendment rights: “Speech that is neither obscene as to 
youths nor subject to some other legitimate proscription cannot 
be suppressed solely to protect the young from ideas or images 
that a legislative body thinks unsuitable for them.”163 
States have also attempted to argue that violent video 
games incite imminent lawless action.164 This argument would 
trigger the Brandenburg v. Ohio165 test, requiring the state to 
 
156. Kenyota, supra note 154, at 800 (quoting Miller v. California, 413 
U.S. 15, 24 (1973)). 
157. Id. 
158. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2735 (2011). 
159. See id. 
160. See id. 
161. Id. at 2735-36 (citing Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 
205, 212-13 (1975)). 
162. Id. at 2736 (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S.629, 640-
41(1968); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944)). 
163. Id. (quoting Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 213-14). 
164. Kenyota, supra note 154, at 801. 
165. 395 U.S. 568 (1942). 
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show that “(1) playing video games somehow tells people to 
commit violent acts and (2) video game players are likely to do 
so. . . .”166 Unfortunately, as the majority points out, the studies 
relied upon could not establish a solid causal link between 
playing games and imminent violence.167 However, these 
studies may still be in their infancy with room for further 
development. In looking at this argument, it is important to 
evaluate the video games themselves. For example, games such 
as Grand Theft Auto IV encourage users to commit crimes, 
such as burglary, robbery, assault, arson, murder, prostitution, 
drug trafficking, as well as evading police in the process.168 
Grand Theft Auto’s website even contains a “comedic” poll: 
“Has GTA IV influenced you to commit crimes?”169 The options 
that users can select from include: (1) “[n]ope, it’s just a game”; 
(2) “[o]nly petty crimes”; (3) “[s]tealing has become a hobby”; (4) 
“[y]es, can’t say more, cops are coming”; (5) “I am the living 
incarnation of Niko” (the game’s main character).170 While 
some gamers may find this poll comedic, it still points out that 
some people could have the mentality to act upon what they 
play out in these so called “harmless” games. 
Perhaps even more shocking, life may have actually 
imitated art (if video games can even be considered art) in 
1999, with the occurrence of one of the most horrific tragedies 
and deadliest school shootings in U.S. history.171 On April 20, 
1999, two teenagers attending Columbine High School opened 
fire and killed thirteen people and injured another twenty-
one.172 In a subsequent investigation of the tragedy, it was 
revealed that the two teens were obsessed with the game 
DOOM, wherein “players took the role of a marine trapped on 
 
166. Kenyota, supra note 154, at 801. 
167. See id. at 802. 
168. See GRAND THEFT AUTO IV, http://www.gta4.net/overview/ (last 
visited Jan. 7, 2013). 
169. Id. 
170. Id. 
171. See Kenyota, supra note 154, at 790-92. 
172. James Brooke, Terror in Littleton: The Overview; 2 Students in 
Colorado School Said to Gun Down as Many as 23 and Kill Themselves in a 
Siege, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1999, at A16, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/04/21/us/terror-littleton-overview-2-students-
colorado-school-said-gun-down-many-23-
kill.html?ref=columbinehighschool&pagewanted=1. 
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Mars that had to shoot and kill aliens in order to escape.”173 
One of the teens responsible for Columbine even stated in a 
video made before the shootings, “it’s going to be like fucking 
Doom!”174 How videogames cannot be said to influence or even 
incite players to reenact what they do in their realistic virtual 
world is absurd— especially when there are specific examples 
of these horrific virtual crimes playing out in reality, and not 
only in virtual reality! 
The Court in Brown, perhaps incorrectly, analogized video 
games to protected books, plays, and movies, because they all 
“communicate ideas—and even social messages.”175 The 
majority then went on to compare various books throughout 
history that have not been suppressed, yet contained gore, 
citing literature such as Grimm’s Fairy Tales, Snow White, 
Cinderella and Hansel and Gretel.176 However, the Court did 
not seem to acknowledge nor take into account the difference 
between reading a book and engaging in the interactive media 
within video games.177 The Court even went so far as to say 
that a book is just as interactive as a video game!178 However, 
there are vast differences between the two. Books do not have 
features such as virtual reality, uncanny graphics or motion 
control which are standard in the newest, most technologically-
advanced games.179 Instead, books require readers to take what 
they have read and use their imagination to paint a picture in 
their minds. Video games, on the other hand, paint these 
pictures for users on the screens right in front of them. 
Furthermore, it is important to note that video game 
technology is still in its infancy. “New developments . . . allow 
for far more graphic and realistic violent acts than ever 
previously depicted . . . [and can apply] to almost every human 
sense.”180 There are even visual enhancements that support 
 
173. Kenyota, supra note 154, at 790. 
174. Id. at 790-91. 
175. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011). 
176. See id. at 2736. 
177. See id. at 2737-38. 
178. See id. at 2738. 
179. See Eric T. Gerson, Note, Video Game Violence and the Technology 
of the Future, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1121, 1123-24 (2011). 
180. Robert Bryan Norris, Jr., Note, It’s All Fun and Games Until 
Someone Gets Hurt: Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association and the 
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three-dimensional gaming,181 making it nearly impossible to 
analogize this technology with a book, containing only written 
words on paper. Games and systems such as Microsoft’s Kinect 
completely eliminate the need for a controller, instead using a 
camera and infrared lens to map a player’s actual body 
movements in three dimensions, literally placing them in the 
game.182 Additionally, this gaming system “allows for voice 
commands and facial recognition technology,”183 again, much 
more advanced than reading a book and drawing imagery with 
one’s own imagination. 
Another important effect of video games on their users is 
the impact of experience. “Evidence of video games 
psychological, emotional, and experiential impact can be found 
in a virtual reality program called Virtual Iraq . . . .”184 This 
game was used to treat soldiers suffering from Post Traumatic 
Stress Disorder (“PTSD”).185 Published results from the 
program show that eighty percent of those who completed the 
program “showed . . . statistically and clinically meaningful 
reductions in PTSD, anxiety, and depression.”186 This study 
helps to illustrate how video games can trigger certain stimuli 
in one’s brain. However, while this game and study were used 
to treat soldiers, isn’t it possible that it would have opposite 
effects on different users, especially those not under medical 
supervision? The Federal Communications Committee 
conducted a study in 2007, regarding the possible effects 
violent programming can have on children.187 This study was 
conducted at the “request [of] thirty-nine members of the U.S. 
House of Representatives.”188 It found that there was deep 
concern among both health professionals and parents, as to the 
 
Problem of Interactivity, 13 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 81, 85 (2011). 
181. Id. at 86. 
182. See id. at 87. 
183. Id. 
184. Id. at 102. 
185. Id. at 102-03. 
186. Id. at 103 (quoting Albert Rizzo et al., Development and Clinical 
Results from the Virtual Iraq Exposure Therapy Application for PTSD, 1208 
ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 114, 122 (2010)). 
187. In re Violent Television Programming and Its Impact on Children, 
22 FCC Rcd. 7929 (2007). 
188. Id. at 7930. 
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effect violence on television may have on children.189 Overall, it 
found “that exposure to violence in the media can increase 
aggressive behavior in children, at least in the short term.”190 
While this study only tapped into the surface of the issue, 
perhaps the most important thing that it did was identify that 
there really could be a problem, a problem that the Court opted 
to ignore. Even though this study shows a possible effect 
immediately after viewing violence on television, it still shows 
an effect—one that must be investigated further to ensure that 
there really are not any adverse long term effects on society’s 
youth. 
Although the statute in Brown was struck down, the 
majority ends with this quote, perhaps leaving the door open 
for the future: “California’s legislation straddles the fence 
between (1) addressing a serious social problem and (2) helping 
concerned parents control their children. Both ends are 
legitimate, but when they affect First Amendment rights they 
must be pursued by means that are neither seriously 
underinclusive nor seriously overinclusive.”191 While the Court 
acknowledges that the legislature may be on to something, it 
again reiterates just how important constitutional guarantees 
are, and is simply not prepared to infringe upon them solely for 
the benefit of protecting children. 
 
V. Conclusion—What’s Next? 
 
The timeline of relevant Supreme Court cases evidences a 
shift in the Court’s attitude throughout the years. At one point 
in the past, one of the Court’s priorities was to ensure that 
children were protected from certain harmful things and 
materials to guarantee their moral and ethical development. 
However, as time went on and with the invention of new 
technologies such as the Internet and “virtual child 
pornography,” the Court began to shift in its attitude, ensuring 
that certain mediums and materials could not be restricted 
solely because they could be harmful to children, especially 
 
189. Id. at 7931. 
190. Id. 
191. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2741-42 (2011). 
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when adults were free to enjoy these materials. Furthermore, 
the Court was not willing to hold that materials may be 
restricted if they could incite future lawless action. The Court 
may have potentially erred in deciding the Brown case. It failed 
to distinguish new technology from written materials that have 
been around for thousands of years. It also failed to 
acknowledge that these new materials might have an 
extremely detrimental effect on our youth, such as severe 
psychological effects or inciting copycat crimes, mimicking 
what went on in a video game. Whatever the effects may be, 
the Court simply does not acknowledge that children’s 
innocence could be in jeopardy! When a child is playing a game 
that instructs players to shoot and kill police, or rape and 
maim women, society is saying that these behaviors are 
acceptable. 
Nevertheless, by 2011, the Court reaffirmed this shift in 
values, holding that children’s right to access materials should 
not be restricted based on the material’s violent nature without 
a concrete showing of negative effects on the children. The 
California law in Brown was struck down and considered a 
constitutional victory, particularly for children. However, it is 
important to note that the 7-2 decision in Brown may really be 
closer to a 5-4 decision as the Chief Justice and Justice Alito’s 
concurring opinions could almost be read as dissents. Both 
Justices agreed that the law should have been struck down 
because of overbreadth; this could mean that a revised and 
more narrowly tailored restriction on video games could 
succeed in the future.192 Furthermore, both the Chief Justice 
and Justice Alito acknowledged that the technology in video 
games is new, unknown, and could lead to a major social 
problem in the future. 
 
[T]he California statue is well intentioned . . . . 
[T]his court should proceed with caution. We 
should make every effort to understand . . . new 
technology. We should take into account the 
possibility that developing technology may have 
important societal implications that will become 
 
192. Id. at 2742-51 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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apparent only with time. We should not jump to 
the conclusion that new technology is 
fundamentally the same as some older things 
with which we are familiar.193 
 
This warning from the two Justices makes the future seem 
somewhat unsure. As to where the Court will go in the future 
regarding children, censorship, and constitutional rights, only 
time will tell; but if the Court continues to follow the pattern it 
has over the past seventy years, it seems as though First 
Amendment rights will continue to take precedent over the 
protection of children’s innocence. 
 
193. Id. at 2742. 
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